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Since 9/11, the lower U.S. federal courts and the Supreme 
Court have decided a series of damages cases implicating national 
security.
1
  These cases have sought monetary compensation for 
persons injured as a result of detention, abuse, and alleged torture in 
the course of the United States’ “war on terrorism” and have involved 
a range of plaintiffs that, in terms of status, fall on a continuum 
ranging from “insiders” (U.S. citizens detained inside the United 
States, even as “enemy combatants”) to “borderline” cases 
(unauthorized aliens within the United States or inadmissible aliens 
turned away at the border) to total “outsiders” (aliens detained 
outside the United States without ever entering the country).  For the 
purposes of this Article, this continuum will be called “the continuum 
 
 * Assistant Professor of Human Rights Law and Public International Law, Seton 
Hall University, Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations. 
 1 This Article examines ten damages cases.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 
(2009) (requiring unauthorized alien detained in the United States to plead more 
specific facts before permitting Bivens remedy to go forward); Rasul v. Myers, 563 
F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir.)(deciding against Bivens remedy for former Guantánamo 
detainees on qualified immunity grounds and, as an alternative, on special factor of 
national security), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009); Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 
949 (9th Cir. 2009)(finding former attorney general not entitled to immunity from 
Bivens suit for devising policy under material witness statute that resulted in U.S. 
citizen’s detention on suspicion of terrorism-related activities), cert. granted 131 S. Ct. 
415 (2010), rev’d 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011); Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 
2008)(denying Bivens remedy on national security grounds to “inadmissible” alien 
apprehended while in transit at John F. Kennedy International Airport, detained in 
the United States, and ultimately rendered to Syria where he was tortured), aff’d en 
banc, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009); El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 302 (4th 
Cir 2007); Vance v. Rumsfeld, 694 F. Supp. 2d 957 (N.D. Ill. 2010); Al-Zahrani v. 
Rumsfeld, 684 F. Supp. 2d 103, 106 (D.D.C. 2010); Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 
1005 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (permitting Bivens suit to go forward against former Office of 
Legal Counsel lawyer who crafted legal authorization for torture of a U.S. citizen); 
Kar v. Rumsfeld, 580 F. Supp. 2d 80, 81–82 (D.D.C. 2008); In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees 
Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D.D.C. 2007))(denying Bivens remedy to detainees held in 
military custody in Iraq and Afghanistan), aff’d sub nom. Ali v. Rumsfeld, No. 07-5178, 
(D.C. Cir. June 21, 2011).   
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of rights” and the damages actions under discussion the “9/11 
damages cases.” 
Though it has been argued that the outcomes in at least some of 
these cases can be explained by reference to the “subterranean 
impact of immigration law,”
2
 it is of course more correct to say that all 
of these cases, and the fundamental logic of immigration law itself, 
are shaped by the doctrine of strict territoriality with respect to aliens 
as previously stated in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez
3
 and Johnson v. 
Eisentrager.
4
  In constitutional law, strict territoriality means that the 
U.S. Constitution applies only to the territories under the sovereign 
control of the United States.
5
 Verdugo-Urquidez and Eisentrager 
expressed the doctrine in terms of a continuum of “voluntary 
contacts,” or sliding “scale,” reflecting the degree to which the alien 
in question has willingly affiliated himself or herself with the United 
States and subjected himself or herself to its laws.
6
  Though the 
continuum is gradual, with gradations of rights at either end, it 
contains a divide located on the “water’s edge” of U.S. territory.  
Until the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Boumediene v. Bush,7 
aliens abroad without prior substantial connections to the United 
States could not lay claim to the protections of the U.S. Constitution 
beyond this divide.  The Court in Boumediene breached this divide for 
the first time with respect to aliens, by holding that detainees in U.S. 
custody at the Guantánamo Bay Detention Center had a 
constitutional right to habeas corpus.
8
   With this landmark decision, 
a majority of the Court embraced the doctrine of “contextual due 
process” developed in prior concurrences by Justice Anthony 
Kennedy.  The decision gave rise to optimism on the part of those 
who have long advocated for detainee rights.  But although it 
dislodged the habeas corpus litigation stayed in the district courts, 
 
 2 Juliet P. Stumpf, The Implausible Alien: Iqbal and the Influence of Immigration Law, 
14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231 (2010). 
 3 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
 4 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
 5 The territoriality doctrine derives from jurisdictional principles under 
international law.   
 6 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271 (finding that the Fourth Amendment has no 
application in the search of an alien’s home located in a foreign country); Eisentrager, 
339 U.S. at 770–71.  For a criticism of the test created by Verdugo-Urquidez, see Jeffrey 
Kahn, Zoya’s Standing Problem, Or, When Should the Constitution Follow the Flag?, 108 
MICH. L. REV. 673, 676 (2010) (arguing that Verdugo-Urquidez created a prudential 
standing test that “is inconsistent with any theoretical view of the Constitution’s 
extraterritoriality”).     
 7 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 8 Id. at 798. 
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Boumediene has so far had no appreciable effect on damages cases.  
Indeed, the current Court is perceived to be hostile even to damages 
claims resting on the Constitution even when brought by U.S. 
citizens.  Boumediene thus represents a breakthrough, but its precise 
implications are not yet clear. 
The divide located at the center of the continuum of rights goes 
a long way to explaining the 9/11 damages cases.  U.S. citizens and 
aliens—legal and illegal—located within the physical territory of the 
United States have had the greatest success bringing damages claims, 
while aliens abroad have had virtually no success bringing such 
claims.
9
  In terms of the degree of injury involved, however, the 
damage cases have been decided inconsistently.  In some cases 
involving egregious acts of torture and abuse occurring over 
extended periods of time, the plaintiffs have been barred from 
pursuing their claims, while some cases involving less serious acts 
have gone forward or settled.
10
  Even worse, the success or failure of 
the claims bears no relation to the actual innocence of the plaintiffs. 
This Article reviews the 9/11 damages cases for the light they 
shed on the post-Boumediene Constitution.  Part I describes the 
contextual due process standard adopted by a majority of the 
Supreme Court in Boumediene.  Part II sets out the basic structure of 
constitutional torts damages actions.  Part III provides an overview of 
the 9/11 damages cases, highlights salient features, and locates each 
on the continuum of rights.  Part IV analyzes what these cases tell us 
about the direction that constitutional jurisprudence regarding 
extraterritoriality will likely take in the future. 
I. THE CONTEXTUAL DUE PROCESS STANDARD 
The litigation involving the question of whether detainees in 
Guantánamo Bay were entitled to the writ of habeas corpus provided 
Justice Kennedy with two opportunities to refine the “contextual due 
process” standard that he had first begun to outline  in a concurrence 
in the 1990 case of United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez. 
11
 The first habeas 
petitions filed on behalf of Guantánamo detainees raised a number 
of constitutional claims, and the lower federal courts dismissed them 
 
 9 Compare Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2009), with Rasul v. 
Rumsfeld, 414 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 2006). 
 10 See infra Part III. 
 11 494 U.S. 259, 278 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 
U.S. 1, 75)(“[T]he question of which specific safeguards . . . are appropriately to be 
applied in a particular context . . . can be reduced to the issue of what process is 
‘due’ a defendant in the particular circumstances of a particular case.”). 
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for lack of jurisdiction, treating the statutory reach of the writ as 
coextensive with its constitutional reach.
12
  In Rasul v. Bush, decided 
in 2004, the Supreme Court held that the federal habeas statute
13
 
extended to Guantánamo Bay by virtue of the United States’ 
“exclusive jurisdiction and control” over the territory on which the 
military base was located.
14
  While not finding it necessary to reach 
the question of whether the Constitution provided an alternative 
ground for jurisdiction, the Supreme Court intimated in a footnote 
that the Court might be willing to reconsider its earlier decisions 
setting down a bright-line rule that aliens abroad could not avail 
themselves of the protections of the Constitution.
15
  Justice Kennedy, 
concurring, found that the question required “an initial inquiry into 
the general circumstances of the detention to determine whether the 
Court has the authority to entertain the petition and to grant relief 
after considering all of the facts presented.”
16
 
After Rasul, the focus of the Guantánamo detainee litigation 
then turned to the question of whether the detainees had any 
affirmative rights to vindicate.  In a case deciding an early set of 
consolidated issues, Judge Joyce Hens Green of the District Court for 
the District of Columbia stated that she was following Justice 
Kennedy’s methodology in holding that detainees could claim the 
protection of the Fifth Amendment.
17
  A holding by Judge Richard 
Leon reached a contrary result.
18
  While the two decisions were on 
appeal, Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA), 
stripping the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions 
filed under the federal habeas statute.
19
  In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the 
Supreme Court held that Congress had not clearly expressed its 
intention to make the DTA retroactive.20  In response to Hamdan, 
 
 12 See Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“We cannot 
see why, or how, the writ [28 U.S.C. § 2241] may be made available to aliens abroad 
when basic constitutional protections are not.”); Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 65 
(D.D.C. 2002)(not clearly distinguishing the statutory and constitutional grounds for 
dismissal). 
 13 The federal habeas statute requires prisoners in custody of the United States to 
be released if they can show that they are being held in violation of the “Constitution 
or laws or treaties of the United States.”  28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2006).  
 14 542 U.S. 466, 482 n. 15  (2004) 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. at 487 (Kennedy, J., concurring).   
 17 In re Guantánamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 463–64 (D.D.C. 2005).   
 18 Khalid v. Bush, 355 F.Supp.2d 311, 322–23 (D.D.C. 2005). 
 19 Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e), 119 Stat. 2680, 2742 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 
801 (2006)). 
 20 548 US 557 (2006). 
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Congress passed the Military Commissions Act (MCA),
21
 in which it 
made clear its intention to strip retroactively the federal courts of 
jurisdiction to hear habeas cases. 
22
  The MCA turned the focus of the 
litigation back to jurisdiction and to the question of whether the 
federal courts had power to hear habeas petitions brought from 
Guantánamo.  This was the question presented to the Supreme Court 
and decided in 2008 in Boumediene v. Bush.
23
 
In a majority opinion written by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme 
Court in Boumediene invalidated Section 7 of the MCA as a violation of 
the Suspension Clause.
24
  Much of Boumediene is devoted to the 
reasoning underlying the holding; the holding itself, however, is fairly 
succinct: 
[W]e conclude that at least three factors are relevant in 
determining the reach of the Suspension Clause: (1) the 
citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the 
process through which that status determination was made; (2) 
the nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention 
took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving 
the prisoner’s entitlement to the writ.
25
 
Justice Kennedy then applied these factors to the cases before him 
and concluded that detainees held in U.S. custody at Guantánamo 
were entitled to the writ of habeas corpus.
26
  Particularly important 
factors in his determination included the inadequacy of the process 
through which the status determinations of the detainees had 
originally been made, the absolute and indefinite control that the 
United States exerts over Guantánamo Bay, the security of the naval 
base, and the lack of potential friction with Cuba resulting from 
proceedings in U.S. courts.
27
 
Justice Kennedy first examined the history of habeas corpus 
before the adoption of the Suspension Clause.
28
  He then turned to 
the constitutional methodology and outlined a case-by-case, 
 
 21 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified as 
amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a–50w (2006) and in other scattered sections of 10 and 
18 U.S.C.). 
 22 Id. at Sec. 7 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 2241(e)(1)). 
 23 After several rounds of briefing, the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia denied jurisdiction in early 2007.  Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 994 
(2007), rev’d 553 U.S. 723 (2008).   
 24 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 795, 798. 
 25 Id. at 776.  
 26 Id. at 771. 
 27 Id. at 767–71. 
 28 Id. at 739–53. 
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provision-by-provision standard regarding the application of the U.S. 
Constitution to territories over which the U.S. government exerts 
control but not sovereignty.
29
  Whether the Constitution constrains 
the actions of the U.S. government abroad—both with respect to 
citizens and aliens, it would seem—is now subject to a functional, 
rather indeterminate test.
30
  A court considering the question must 
examine the ‘“particular circumstances, the practical necessities, and 
the possible alternatives which Congress had before it’” and, in 
particular, whether judicial enforcement of the provision would be 
‘“impracticable and anomalous.’”
31
  
Boumediene thus opened a small fissure in the strict territoriality 
doctrine, through which other rights beyond the Suspension Clause 
might conceivably flow. 
II. STRUCTURE OF DAMAGES SUITS 
While the habeas litigation was ongoing, individual suits for 
damages related to post-9/11 detention and torture commenced.  In 
comparison with the habeas litigation, the damages actions have been 
isolated and scattershot.  In addition to stripping the federal courts of 
jurisdiction to hear habeas claims, the MCA stripped the courts of  
jurisdiction  
to hear or consider any other action against the United States or 
its agents relating to any aspect of the detention, transfer, 
treatment, trial, or conditions of confinement of an alien who is 
or was detained by the United States and has been determined by 
the United States to have been properly detained as an enemy 
combatant or is awaiting such determination.
32
   
This jurisdictional bar has limited the number of eligible plaintiffs. 
The suits that have not been barred have a common structure.  
Whether brought by citizens or aliens, all of the 9/11 damages cases 
involve three basic analytical components: a) determination of an 
underlying right and/or cause of action, b) assertion of defenses 
related to questions of immunity, and c) use of the ancillary state 
secrets doctrine. 
33
  Those three basic components do not always 
occur in the same sequence, and a particular case may not include all 
three. 
 
 29 See generally id. 
 30 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723. 
 31 Id. at 759. 
 32 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2)(2006). 
 33 See infra Part II.C. 
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Since a Bivens action presupposes a constitutional right, and 
qualified immunity requires that the right be clearly established, 
damages cases reveal the underlying constitutional jurisprudence at 
several stages of the litigation.  A court may decide that the plaintiff 
has no cause of action because she is not entitled to the protections 
of the U.S. Constitution.  The Supreme Court has signaled 
ambivalence about the Bivens doctrine almost since the moment it 
created the doctrine in 1973 and has recently stated that Bivens 
should not be extended to “new contexts.”34  Federal courts  find it 
easy to dismiss damages cases on qualified immunity grounds when 
the plaintiffs are aliens and the relevant acts occurred abroad.  Even 
though the Supreme Court has held that detainees at Guantánamo 
Bay have a constitutional right to habeas corpus, the government has 
successfully argued that that right was not clearly established when 
the events took place.  In addition, the U.S. government has been 
quicker to invoke the state secrets privilege when the plaintiffs are 
aliens and the claims arise out of acts occurring  abroad. 
A. The Bivens Cause of Action 
Generally, in a damages action, the first question to address is 
whether plaintiffs have a cause of action.  In the 9/11 damages cases, 
plaintiffs typically have two alternatives: either the cause of action is 
based directly on the U.S. Constitution or it is based on international 
law—in which case the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) provides federal 
courts with jurisdiction.
35
  This discussion focuses only on the Bivens 
claims; owing to the structure of domestic U.S. immunity law, the 
international law claims are effectively subordinate to the 
constitutional claims.
36
 
A Bivens action enables a plaintiff to bring a direct constitutional 
claim for damages, even where Congress has not created a cause of 
 
 34 Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 (2001).   
 35 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).  U.S. citizen plaintiffs or alien plaintiffs present in the 
United States when the abuse allegedly occurred usually bring Bivens claims only.  
Plaintiffs who were outside the United States when the abuse allegedly occurred 
usually bring both Bivens and ATS claims. 
 36 This subordination occurs because of the structure of the federal immunity 
policy.  In a suit against a federal officer in his personal capacity, unless the claimant 
alleges a violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right, or unless the court 
finds that the official has been acting outside of the scope of his employment, the 
United States will automatically be substituted as defendant.  28 U.S.C. §1346(b), 
§2679(b)(1).  In cases arising in a foreign country, this substitution will result in 
automatic dismissal.  Id. §2680(k).  
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action by statute.
37
  A violation of the U.S. Constitution does not, 
however, automatically give rise to a Bivens cause of action.  Bivens is a 
judge-made remedy and, in recent years, the doctrine has been 
increasingly narrowed by the Supreme Court.  In order to determine 
whether it is appropriate to create a Bivens remedy, courts use a two-
prong test.  First, the court must determine whether any alternative, 
existing process for protecting the interest amounts to a convincing 
reason for the judicial branch to refrain from providing a new and 
freestanding remedy in damages;
38
 second, if no such process exists, 
“‘the federal courts must make the kind of remedial determination 
that is appropriate for a common-law tribunal, paying particular 
heed, however, to any special factors counseling hesitation before 
authorizing a new kind of federal litigation.’”
39
  As a threshold 
question, the court must ask whether “the petitioner asserts a 
constitutionally protected right.”
40
  Accordingly, the existence of this 
right is either assumed or assessed first. 
Scholars and other Supreme Court watchers are generally of the 
view that the Court has become increasingly hostile to Bivens actions, 
cutting back the doctrine whenever possible.
41
  In Correctional Services 
Corporation v. Malesko, the Court stated that Bivens should not be 
extended to any “new context” or “new category of defendants.”
42
  
The meaning that the Supreme Court has given to “context” in its 
jurisprudence has aptly been described as “less than clear.”
43
  A “new 
context” could mean a new “cause of action.”  Or, it could mean a 
claim under another constitutional amendment.  The Supreme 
Court’s 2007 decision Wilkie v. Robbins suggests an understanding of 
“context” as a “cause of action.”
44
  Lower courts, however, have 
interpreted Wilkie to mean that Bivens should not be extended to new 
 
 37 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388, 397 (1971). 
 38 Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007) (citing Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 
378 (1983)). 
 39 Id. at 550 (quoting Lucas, 462 U.S. at 378).       
 40 Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 234 (1979). 
 41 See Joan Steinman, Backing off Bivens and the Ramifications of this Retreat for the 
Vindication of First Amendment Rights, 83 MICH. L. REV. 269 (1984); Laurence H. Tribe, 
Death by a Thousand Cuts: Constitutional Wrongs Without Remedies after Wilkie v. Robbins, 
2007 CATO S. CT. REV. 23 (2007). 
 42 534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001) (“We have consistently refused to extend Bivens liability 
to any new context or category of defendants.”). 
 43 Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 596–97 (2d Cir. 2009) (Sack, J., dissenting).   
 44 Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 555 (describing difficulty in “defining a workable cause of 
action”). 
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“situations” defined in a more “gestalt”-like sense.
45
  Two years after 
Wilkie, in Iqbal v. Ashcroft, the Court seemed to incline to the meaning 
of “context” as a claim under another amendment.46  In Iqbal, the 
Court cast doubt on whether it would recognize a Bivens action under 
the First Amendment, even though the Supreme Court had 
previously fashioned Bivens actions under the Fourth, Fifth, and 
Eighth Amendments.
47
 
In the 9/11 damages cases, the second Bivens prong has played 
the most important role in judicial decisions.  It is manifestly clear 
that Congress has not yet created an alternative remedial scheme for 
victims of 9/11 counterterrorism actions.  There have been no high-
level prosecutions, no public apologies, and no compensation funds, 
even in instances where the United States has admitted cases of 
mistaken identity.  As a result, victims of human rights violations in 
the war on terrorism have been forced to pursue the route of civil 
damages claims.
48
  While the distinction between the first and second 
Bivens prongs is blurred and unclear in some Supreme Court cases,
49
 
 
 45 For example, the Second Circuit in Arar described “extraordinary rendition” as 
a new “context” and declined to recognize a Bivens remedy for a legal alien who was 
detained in transit on U.S. territory.  Arar, 585 F.3d at 572 (“[N]o court has 
previously afforded a Bivens remedy for extraordinary rendition.”). 
 46 See 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009) 
 47 Id.  But see Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006) (involving a Bivens claim 
under the First Amendment for retaliatory prosecution).  It currently seems well 
settled among the lower courts that First Amendment violations give rise to a Bivens 
cause of action.  See, e.g., White v. Boyle, 538 F.2d 1077 (4th Cir. 1976); Paton v. 
LaPrade, 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975); Hostrop v. Bd. of Junior College Dist., 471 
F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1972).  In an earlier First Amendment case, Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 
367 (1983), the Supreme Court held that the availability of a meaningful remedial 
scheme precluded the fashioning of a Bivens remedy.   
 48 See, e.g., Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 49 Consideration of an alternative remedial scheme was initially articulated as 
part of a “special factors” analysis in Bivens itself.  Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396–97 (1971); see also Davis v. 
Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 247–48 (1979).  In Carlson v. Green, a case against federal 
prison officials, the Court bifurcated the considerations and articulated a two-step 
test that required a clear statement from Congress that an alternative remedial 
scheme was intended to preclude a Bivens remedy.  446 U.S. 14, 18–19 (1980).  In 
Bush v. Lucas, the Court redefined the “special factors” standard as the balancing test 
recently reaffirmed in Wilkie.  462 U.S. 367 (1983).  The Lucas Court maintained a 
distinction between considering the alternative remedies and the “special factors” 
analysis, but the entirety of its reasoning shows that the “special factor” on which the 
Court based its decision not to recognize a remedy in the absence of explicit 
authorization from Congress was the existence of “an elaborate remedial system that 
has been constructed step by step, with careful attention to conflicting policy 
considerations.”  Id. at 380–89.  In Schweiker v. Chilicky, the Court folded the 
alternative remedial scheme prong back into the “special factors” test, dropping the 
requirement of a clear statement from Congress and defining “special factors” to 
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lower courts since 9/11 have invoked special factors to justify, on 
national security grounds, refusal to fashion a remedy that would 
hold officials liable.
50
  For aliens outside of the United States (or 
subject to the entry fiction), special factors have operated as an 
absolute bar, as courts have essentially crafted a new “national 
security” component to the doctrine.
51
 
B. Qualified Immunity 
Immunity is the second integral component to damages claims 
that may reveal the underlying constitutional jurisprudence.
52
  The 
doctrine of qualified immunity protects “government officials 
 
“include an appropriate judicial deference to indications that congressional inaction 
has not been inadvertent.”  487 U.S. 412, 423 (1988).  Although Wilkie did not 
involve a comprehensive scheme already created by Congress, the Court considered 
the remedies available to the plaintiff in reaching the conclusion that “any damages 
remedy for actions by Government employees who push too hard for the 
Government’s benefit may come better, if at all, through legislation.” Wilkie v. 
Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 562 (2007). 
 50 For a discussion of the “special factors” doctrine in the context of national 
security cases, see Stephen I. Vladeck, National Security and Bivens After Iqbal, 14 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 255 (2010).  Though agreeing with Professor Vladeck that 
Bivens remains an important “national security remedy of last resort,” id. at 266, the 
Author takes issue with his view that the Supreme Court’s decision in Wilkie turned 
on “special factors.”  Id. at 265–66.  The Wilkie dissent characterized the majority 
holding in that way, Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 577 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), but the majority 
did not actually invoke “special factors.”  Rather, the majority claimed to have 
difficulty “defining a workable cause of action” for the deprivation of rights the 
plaintiff suffered.  Id. at 555 (majority opinion).  The majority thus suggested that it 
was simply making “the kind of remedial determination that is appropriate for a 
common-law tribunal.”  Id. at 550.  “Special factors” are part of that remedial 
determination but not coextensive with it. 
 51 See, e.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 52 If a plaintiff successfully alleges a constitutional violation, or the court assumes 
that a claim will be successful, the case falls under one of the two exceptions to 
absolute immunity found in the Westfall Amendment to the Federal Tort Claims Act 
(FTCA), Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 28 U.S.C. (2006)).  Plaintiffs who are subject to these exceptions may 
overcome the absolute immunity provided to the United States by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 
2671 (2006).  The case then continues against the individual defendants, and the 
court must determine if the individual defendants are protected by qualified 
immunity.  In a suit against a federal officer as an individual, the FTCA provides for 
the automatic substitution of the U.S. government as defendant if the officer was 
acting within the scope of his or her employment, unless the claim alleges a violation 
of the U.S. Constitution or a federal statute that provides for a private right of action.  
See, e.g., In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 114–15 (D.D.C. 2007) 
(“[T]he plaintiffs’ lawsuit is converted to one against the United States under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act, in which case Rumsfeld [and other defendants] . . . shall be 
dismissed as parties and the United States shall be substituted as the sole defendant . 
. . .”).  
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performing discretionary functions” from liability for civil damages so 
long as their conduct, at the time that it occurred, did not violate any 
“clearly established” constitutional or statutory rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known.
53
  The qualified immunity 
doctrine has recently been in some flux with regard to the order in 
which courts should decide its component prongs.
54
  Under current 
Supreme Court precedent established in Pearson v. Callahan, it is not 
necessary to first establish that a constitutional right exists in order to 
conclude that, even if such a right existed, it would not be “clearly 
established.”
55
  Courts may now dismiss a case on qualified immunity 
grounds without first determining if the right clearly exists.  Many of 
the cases discussed below, however, were decided under the earlier 
rule, set down in Saucier v. Katz, that existence of a right should be 
decided before deciding whether it is “clearly established.”
56
 
C. Ancillary Doctrines: State Secrets Privilege 
In several 9/11 damages cases—usually those involving 
extraordinary rendition—the government has successfully used the 
state secrets doctrine to bring about dismissals.
57
  Specific to civil 
litigation, the state secrets doctrine is an evidentiary privilege that the 
government may assert in order to protect information deemed 
important to national security.  The law is currently unsettled as to 
whether the privilege may apply only to discrete pieces of evidence or 
may apply broadly, as a jurisdictional bar, to force dismissal of entire 
lawsuits.  Whether held to be broad or narrow, the state secrets 
privilege is absolute and not subject to judicial balancing.
58
 
 
 53 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).  Qualified immunity is an 
affirmative defense.  See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).  Once the 
defendant pleads qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that 
the right allegedly violated was “clearly established” at the time the conduct at issue 
occurred.  Qualified Immunity is intended to provide “immunity from suit rather 
than a mere defense from liability.”  Mitchell v. Forsythe, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).  
A denial of qualified immunity may be immediately certified for interlocutory 
appeal.  Id. at 530.     
 54 See Pearson v. Callahan 555 U.S. 223, 237 (2009)(“There are cases in which it is 
plain that a constitutional right is not clearly established but far from obvious 
whether in fact there is such a right.”). 
 55 Id. 
 56 See, e.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 274 n.9 (2006) (stating that 
qualified immunity arguments “will be considered, as necessary, only after the 
underlying constitutional questions have been addressed”).  
 57 See, e.g., El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 302 (4th Cir 2007). 
 58 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953) (“[E]ven the most compelling 
necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied 
that military secrets are at stake.”). 
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III. THE 9/11 DAMAGES CASES 
In the 9/11 damages cases, courts have appeared reluctant to 
abandon the continuum of rights implicit in the constitutional 
territoriality doctrine, especially in light of a highly controversial 
cause of action, such as Bivens.
59
  The details of a number of these 
cases are well-known in isolation, but reviewing them side-by-side 
throws the continuum of rights into particular relief.  This Part 
divides the 9/11 damages cases into three categories—first, cases 
brought by U.S. citizens; second, cases brought by legal, illegal, or 
inadmissible aliens, when the injuries occurred or were initiated in 
the United States; and third, cases brought by aliens when the 
injuries occurred outside the United States.  The litigation in a 
number of these cases had not run its course when the Supreme 
Court decided Boumediene and a few cases were reconsidered in light 
of that decision.  Boumediene has had no appreciable effect, except 
perhaps in making it easier to deny rights to U.S. citizens injured in 
locations outside the United States. 
A. U.S. Citizens  
Citizenship is not a guarantor of recovery, but citizen status 
means that courts generally have not engaged in a protracted analysis 
before concluding that claimants have constitutional rights to assert.  
The rights to be free from torture and arbitrary detention are at the 
core of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution.  Nonetheless, it is 
surprising that special factors have not weighed more heavily even in 
these cases. 
1. Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd 
Abdullah Al-Kidd is a U.S. citizen and Muslim convert who was 
arrested at Dulles International Airport as he waited to board a plane 
to Saudi Arabia.
60
  He was subsequently detained under the material 
witness statute in 2003.
61
  After his arrest, Al-Kidd was held in custody 
 
 59 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011). 
 60 Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 951 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted 131 S. Ct. 
415 (2010), rev’d 131 S. Ct. 2074.  Al-Kidd was not charged with a crime, but the 
government alleged that he possessed “information germane” to the case against 
another individual, Sami Omar Al-Hussayen (indicted for visa fraud and making false 
statements to U.S. officials), and that this information would be “crucial to the 
prosecution” of Al-Hussayen.  Id. at 953. 
 61 Id. at 952; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2006). 
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for sixteen days, during which time he was held at several high-
security federal prison facilities, placed in cells lit twenty-four hours a 
day, strip searched repeatedly, and allowed out of his cell for only 
one to two hours a day.
62
  Al-Kidd alleged that the government never 
intended to subpoena him as a material witness—and in any event he 
was never called as a witness—and that the material witness statute 
had been used as a pretext for holding him preventatively.
63
  He 
brought suit against Attorney General John Ashcroft and a number of 
lower-level officials.
64
  The district court held that none of the 
defendants were protected by qualified immunity; Ashcroft was the 
only defendant who appealed the denial, losing in the Ninth Circuit.
65
  
Al-Kidd’s right to bring a Bivens action was never in question, and he 
eventually settled with lower level officials.
66
  His case against Ashcroft  
reached the Supreme Court and was reversed on qualified immunity 
grounds, though it appears that the outcome might have been 
different had Al-Kidd, on the appeal, challenged the constitutionality  
of his seizure.
67
  In the course of the litigation, Al-Kidd’s right to 
travel was restricted, his marriage fell apart, and he was unable to find 
employment.
68
 
2. Padilla v. Yoo 
In two cases raising more complicated national security 
questions, Jose Padilla brought a number of Bivens and other claims 
related to his incommunicado detention in the United States as an 
 
 62 Al-Kidd, 580 F.3d at 953.  Even after he was released from detention, by court 
order, he had to surrender his passport, restrict his domestic travel to three states, 
and consent to home visits for a supervisory period of almost a year.  Id. 
 63 Id. at 982–83. 
 64 Id. at 955.   
 65 Id. at 956. 
 66 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, ALLIANCE FOR JUST., http://www.afj.org/connect-with-the-
issues/the-corporate-court/ashcroft-v-al-Kidd.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2011).  Al-
Kidd eventually settled with the wardens of the various facilities where he had been 
held, for a combination of monetary and institutional reforms.  Abdullah al-Kidd v. 
John Ashcroft, et al., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Mar. 4, 2011), 
http://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights-national-security/abdullah-al-Kidd-v-john-
ashcroft-et-al. 
 67 Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011) (“Because al-Kidd concedes 
that individualized suspicion supported the issuance of the material-witness arrest 
warrant; and does not assert that his arrest would have been unconstitutional absent 
the alleged pretextual use of the warrant; we find no Fourth Amendment 
violation.”).   
 68 See Al-Kidd, 580 F.3d at 952–53.   
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“enemy combatant.”
69
  After being apprehended at Chicago O’Hare 
airport as he sought to enter the United States, allegedly to detonate 
a dirty bomb in a major American city,
70
 Padilla was indicted on 
material support to terrorism charges and was eventually convicted 
for a number of offenses connected to an unrelated alleged plot.
71
  
After his initial arrest, Padilla was transferred to a military brig where, 
for two years, he was allegedly denied access to a lawyer, held 
incommunicado, and subjected to “enhanced interrogation 
techniques.” 
While serving his criminal sentence, he filed, along with his 
mother, two damages suits alleging a number of constitutional 
violations, one against Donald Rumsfeld and other military 
defendants in South Carolina
72
 and another in California against 
former Bush administration lawyer John Yoo, the Office of Legal 
Counsel lawyer who allegedly designed and implemented the 
enhanced interrogation policy.
73
  In his defense, Yoo relied primarily 
on the special factors and qualified immunity.
74
  In a well-reasoned 
opinion, the district court rejected the contention that national 
security should be considered a special factor and noted that Yoo had 
construed the special factors doctrine so as to make it tantamount to 
the state secrets privilege, which can only be asserted by the 
government itself.
75
  Yoo immediately appealed the qualified 
immunity holding as of right.
76
  On appeal, the U.S. government did 
not formally intervene in the case and did not assert the state secrets 
defense.  Rather, supporting Yoo, the government as amicus curiae, 
urged the court to dismiss the case based on the special factors of 
 
 69 Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 764 F.Supp.2d 787 (D.S.C. 2011); Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. 
Supp. 2d 1005, 1034 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
 70 Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1012–13.  According to Attorney General John 
Ashcroft, “[i]n apprehending Al Muhajir [Padilla’s alleged Muslim name,] as he 
sought entry into the United States, [the government] ha[s] disrupted an unfolding 
terrorist plot to attack the United States by exploding a radioactive ‘“dirty bomb.’”  
Ashcroft Statement on ‘Dirty Bomb’ Suspect, CNN (June 2, 2002), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2002-06-10/us/ashcroft.announcement_1_dirty-bomb-
abdullah-al-muhajir-al-qaeda-officials?_s=PM:US.  
 71 Jenny S. Martinez, The Real Verdict on Jose Padilla, WASH. POST., Aug. 17, 2007, at 
A23. 
 72 Lebron, 764 F. Supp. 2d 787. 
 73 Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1014.  Padilla alleged that he was subjected to 
twenty-five separate techniques.  Id. at 1013–14. 
 74 See id. at 1025–26. 
 75 Id. at 1028–29.  
 76 Civil Appeals Docketing Statement at 1, Padilla v. Yoo, No. 09-16478 (9th Cir. 
July 24, 2009). 
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national security and foreign affairs.
77
  The case in South Carolina was 
dismissed on special factors and qualified immunity, among other 
grounds.78 
3. Vance v. Rumsfeld and Kar v. Rumsfeld 
A pair of recent cases deal with the unusual circumstances of 
American citizens held, incommunicado, in military custody outside 
of the United States and subjected to abusive treatment and 
enhanced interrogation techniques.  The earlier of these cases, Kar v. 
Rumsfeld, involved a U.S. citizen who was in Iraq to make a 
documentary and was taken into custody by the U.S. military after a 
taxi he had hired was searched at a checkpoint and found to contain 
materials that could be used to make roadside explosives.
79
  Kar was 
held for a short time in an “outdoor cage” in Iraq’s “sweltering heat,” 
slammed against a wall in Abu Ghraib, held for seven weeks in solitary 
confinement at Camp Cropper in a room without a sink or a toilet, 
and denied access to a lawyer.
80
  The district court found that Kar had 
made out a Fourth Amendment claim that he was unlawfully denied a 
probable cause hearing; nevertheless, it held that “his rights were not 
clearly established ‘in light of the specific context of the case.’”
81
 
Vance v. Rumsfeld involved two American citizens working for a 
private Iraqi security firm, Shield Group Security (SGS).
82
  Donald 
Vance and Nathan Ertel became suspicious that the firm was involved 
in selling arms to insurgents and made their suspicions known to the 
FBI.
83
  After SGS became distrustful of the two and took away their 
access cards, the two had to be forcibly removed from the SGS 
compound by U.S. forces.
84
  Thereafter, they were taken into U.S. 
custody and held in several U.S. military compounds, subjected to 
harsh detention conditions and coercive interrogation tactics, and 
denied access to a lawyer until their release was ultimately 
authorized.
85
  The abuses they alleged were typical of suspects held in 
 
 77 Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant at 2–4, 24, 
Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (9th Cir. 2009)(No. 09-16478).   
 78  See Lebron, 764 F. Supp. 2d 787. 
 79 580 F. Supp. 2d 80, 81–82 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 80 Id. at 82.   
 81 Id. at 83 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). 
 82 No. 10-1687, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 16338 (7th Cir. Aug. 8, 2011). 
 83 Id. at *7. 
 84 Id. at *9. 
 85 Vance v. Rumsfeld, 694 F. Supp. 2d 957, 959–60 (2010), aff’d 2011 App. LEXIS 
16338 (7th Cir. Aug. 8, 2011). 
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war on terrorism operations: “threats of violence and actual violence, 
sleep deprivation and alteration, extremes of temperature, extremes 
of sound, light manipulation, threats of indefinite detention, denial 
of food, denial of water, denial of medical care, yelling, prolonged, 
solitary confinement, incommunicado detention, falsified allegations, 
and other psychologically-disruptive and injurious techniques.”
86
  The 
district court held that the plaintiffs’ allegations were sufficient to 
survive Rumsfeld’s motion to dismiss on qualified immunity and lack 
of personal involvement grounds.
87
  The court cited Kar in stating 
that “American citizens do not forfeit their core constitutional rights 
when they leave the United States, even when their destination is a 
foreign war zone.”
88
  The Seventh Circuit distinguished Boumediene as 
dealing with procedural due process only
89
 and affirmed most of the 
district court’s opinion in a decision holding that “[t]he wrongdoing 
alleged here violates the most basic terms of the constitutional 
compact between our government and the citizens of this country.”
90
 
B. Illegal and Inadmissible Aliens in U.S. Territory 
An intermediate category includes non-citizens who were 
physically present in the United States at the time they were taken 
into custody.  For the purposes of this Article, legal, illegal, and 
inadmissible aliens will be grouped together in a single category that, 
it should be recognized at the outset, is broad and heterogeneous in 
terms of status. 
1. Ashcroft v. Iqbal 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal culminated an action yielding some damages for 
two illegal aliens.
91
  Iqbal involved a Pakistani citizen who was living in 
 
 86 Id. at 961. 
 87 Id. at 978. 
 88 Id. at 970 (citing Kar v. Rumsfeld, 580 F. Supp. 2d 80 (2008)).   
 89 Vance, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 16338, at *55 (“Those procedural issues are 
undoubtedly difficult. But they shed no useful light on how a reasonable federal 
official might have thought that the Constitution permitted him to torture, or to 
authorize the torture of, a civilian U.S. citizen.”). 
 90 Id. at *41.   
 91 129 S. Ct. 1937(2009).  This case is better known for heightening the pleading 
standard for all civil actions under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  
After the Supreme Court’s decision, Iqbal settled his claims against the remaining 
defendants.  See Stipulation Withdrawing Appeal from Active Consideration, Iqbal v. 
Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007) (No. 05-5768-cv).  At the district court level, the 
case name was Elmaghraby v. Aschroft, No. 04-CV-1809, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21434, 
at *1 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005).  Co-plaintiff Elmaghraby settled his claim for 
$300,000 and was not part of the Supreme Court appeal.  Brief for Respondent 
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the United States on 9/11, allegedly with fraudulent immigration 
papers.
92
  In the domestic sweeps after 9/11, Javaid Iqbal was picked 
up and detained in the maximum security section of the 
Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York
93
  During his 
detention, Iqbal was allegedly kept in lockdown twenty-four hours a 
day, kicked and dragged across his cell, subjected to serial strip and 
cavity searches, not allowed to pray, and subjected to other alleged 
abuses.
94
  Iqbal sued several lower-level officials, former Attorney 
General John Ashcroft, and former FBI Director Robert Mueller for 
various violations of his constitutional rights.
95
 
2. Arar v. Ashcroft 
Arar v. Ashcroft
96
 is perhaps the most troubling of all the 9/11 
damages cases, because the plaintiff—Syrian-Canadian Mahar Arar—
was physically present in the United States when the chain of events 
giving rise to his claims began.
97
  After being wrongly informed by 
Canadian authorities that Arar was an “Islamic extremist” and the 
“target,” or “principal subject,” of a terrorism investigation,
98
 U.S. 
authorities apprehended Arar when he was in transit to Canada from 
North Africa, where he had been vacationing, took him into U.S. 
custody, declared him inadmissible to the United States because of 
alleged membership in Al Qaeda, and initiated deportation 
proceedings to Syria, a country notorious for its use of torture.
99
  
 
Javaid Iqbal at 39, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (No. 07-1015); see also 
Nina Bernstein, U.S. Is Settling Detainee’s Suit in 9/11 Sweep, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2006, 
at A1 (reporting on the case details and the settlement amount). 
 92 Elmaghraby, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21434, at *2–3. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at *16–17.   
 95 Iqbal claimed that Ashcroft and Mueller were liable for, respectively, 
“unconstitutionally designating him as “a person of high interest” on the basis of 
“race, religion, or national origin” and for designing and implementing the 
restrictive confinement-conditions policy and knowing of and condoning the abuse.  
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1944 (2009). 
 96 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d en 
banc, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010).  
 97 Arar had also lived for some time in the United States as a legal alien. 2 
COMM’N INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF CANADIAN OFFICIALS IN RELATION TO MAHER 
ARAR, REPORT OF THE EVENTS RELATING TO MAHER ARAR: FACTUAL BACKGROUND 817 
(2006), available at  http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/pdfs/cm_arar_bgv2-eng.pdf. 
 98 COMM’N INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF CANADIAN OFFICIALS IN RELATION TO 
MAHER ARAR, REPORT OF THE EVENTS RELATING TO MAHER ARAR: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 24–25, available at http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/pdfs/cm_arar_rec-
eng.pdf#53.   
 99 Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 253–54. 
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Immigration officials then deported him to Syria without informing 
his lawyers.
100
  For ten months, Syrian authorities kept Arar in a “grave 
cell,” 6 feet long by 7 feet high and 3 feet wide, where he was exposed 
to dampness and cold, denied sanitary facilities, and given hardly 
edible food.101  In these conditions, Arar lost forty pounds.
102
  The cell 
was infested with rats and occasionally used as a toilet by stray cats.
103
  
His captors beat him with two-inch thick electric cables on his palms, 
hips, and lower back, as well as just using their fists.104  They also 
allegedly confined him in a room where he could overhear the 
screams of other detainees being tortured.
105
  According to the 
district court, the question whether Arar possessed substantive rights 
under the Due Process Clause was a close one.
106
  The court, however, 
decided, on special factors grounds,
107
 that national security and 
foreign policy considerations foreclosed Arar’s claims.
108
  Though the 
U.S. government asserted the state secrets privilege,
109
 it did not 
 
 100 Id. at 254.  Arar asserted one claim under the Torture Victims Protection Act 
and three claims under the U.S. Constitution.  See Complaint and Demand for Jury 
Trial, Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)(No. cv-04-0249), available 
at  http://ccrjustice.org/v2/legal/september_11th/docs/ArarComplaint.pdf.  
 101  Id. ¶ 58. 
 102 Id. ¶ 59. 
 103 Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 254.    
 104 Id. at 255.   
 105 Id.   
 106 Id. at 279. 
 107 Id. (“Assuming, without resolving, the existence of some substantive 
protection, Arar’s claims are foreclosed under an exception to the Bivens doctrine.”). 
 108 Judge Trager also found that Arar’s rendition claims were foreclosed by special 
factors because Congress was better suited than the courts to fashion a remedy 
tailored to Arar’s circumstances.  Id. at 281–83.   Judge Trager relied on Bush v. Lucas 
for the proposition that “courts will refrain from extending a Bivens claim if doing so 
trammels upon matters best decided by coordinate branches of government.”  414 F. 
Supp. 2d 250, 279 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 380 
(1983)). 
 109 The U.S. government submitted a notice of filing and affidavits by Acting 
Attorney James B. Comey and Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security 
Tom Ridge formally asserted the privilege, and then moved to dismiss the case under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.  See Memorandum in Support of the United 
States’ Assertion of State Secrets Privilege, Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 04-CV-249).   It is curious that the U.S. government did not 
formally intervene in the case.  Plaintiff’s attorney, Center for Constitutional Rights’ 
lawyer Maria LaHood, in a personal communication with the Author, noted that the 
complaint asked for injunctive relief, so the defendants were sued in their official 
capacity and thus the U.S. government was already de facto in the suit.   
WILSON_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/16/2011  2:42 PM 
2011] DAMAGES OR NOTHING 1509 
formally intervene in the case, and the state secrets issue was never 
reached by the court.
110
 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s opinion twice—once in a three-judge panel
111
 and 
again en banc.
112
  The en banc decision did not reach the qualified 
immunity defense or the state secrets privilege,
113
  but focused 
primarily on special factors and whether Arar had a viable Bivens 
claim in view of the national security interests at stake.
114
  Referring to 
the Supreme Court’s injunction in Malesko that Bivens not be 
extended to new contexts, the majority first noted that ‘“[c]ontext is 
not defined in the case law” and then elected to construe the term “as 
it is commonly used in law: to reflect a potentially recurring scenario 
that has similar legal and factual components.”  Based on that 
definition, the court concluded that rendition was a “new context.”
115
  
Judge Sack’s dissent correctly noted that the majority could only 
reach this conclusion by severing the domestic facts in Arar’s 
complaint from the international ones and then dismissing them as 
insufficiently pled.116 
C. Aliens Abroad 
The damages cases of aliens abroad can be grouped in two ways.  
First, geographically—those based on acts occurring in Guantánamo 
versus those based on acts occurring outside Guantánamo.  Second, 
administratively—those involving the military versus those involving 
the Central Intelligence Agency. 
1. Guantánamo 
i. Rasul v. Myers 
The interests of four British men led to the filing of Rasul v. 
Rumsfeld.
117
  The plaintiffs alleged that while detained in Guantánamo 
 
 110 Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 287 (explaining it was not necessary to reach the state 
secrets issue because the case could be decided on constitutional and statutory 
grounds).   
 111 Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157, 162 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d en banc, 585 F.3d 559 
(2d Cir. 2009). 
 112 Arar, 585 F.3d at 559. 
 113 Id. at 563.   
 114 Id. at 574. 
 115 Id. at 572; Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 (2001).  
 116 Id. at 582–83 (J. Sack, concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 117 414 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 2006), aff’d sub nom. Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644 
(D.C. Cir. 2008), vacated, 555 U.S. 1083 (2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 563 F.3d 527 
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they were subjected to repeated beatings and anal probes, that they 
were deprived of sleep, shackled for hours, held incommunicado, 
injected with unknown substances, and, perhaps most grievously, 
harassed and humiliated as they attempted to practice their 
religion.
118
  They brought seven causes of action, including two under 
the U.S. Constitution (Fifth and the Eighth Amendments) and one 
under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).
119
 
Thus far, Rasul plaintiffs have had the most success of all the 
9/11 damages cases involving alien plaintiffs held outside U.S. 
sovereign territory.  The reason for this success is that the RFRA 
explicitly provides for a private right of action
120
 and by its terms is not 
geographically limited.  While the plaintiffs’ other claims suffered the 
usual fate of dismissal on territorial grounds,
121
 Judge Urbina of the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia issued a separate 
opinion on the RFRA claim alone, finding the RFRA applied to 
Guantánamo Bay, that the plaintiffs had asserted a valid cause of 
action, and that the defendants did not have qualified immunity.
122
  
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit read into the statute 
an implicit limitation on the rights established by the RFRA.
123
  The 
subsequent unsuccessful appeals centered on the usual Bivens 
question, plus the question of whether the legislature intended to 
make the RFRA co-extensive with First Amendment rights or broader 
in scope.
124
 
 
(D.C. Cir. 2009).  Three of the men had been plaintiffs in the original Rasul v. Bush 
habeas litigation in 2004.  Compare Complaint, Rasul v. Rumsfeld, 414 F. Supp. 2d 26 
(D.D.C. 2004) (No. 04-CV-01864) [hereinafter Complaint, Rasul I] (plaintiffs 
include: Shafiq Rasul, Asif Iqbal, Rhuhel Ahmed, and Jamal Al-Harith), with 
Complaint, Rasul v. Bush, No. 02-299,  (D.D.C. Apr. 21, 2005). 
 118 Rasul, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 28–29. 
 119 See Complaint, Rasul I, supra note 117. 
 120 See id.; see also Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000b(b)(1) (2006); cf. City 
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997) (holding RFRA unconstitutional as 
applied to states).   
 121 Rasul, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 42–44. 
 122 Rasul v. Rumsfeld, 433 F. Supp. 2d 58, 67-71 (D.D.C. 2006), rev’d sub nom. Rasul 
v. Myers, 06-5209, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS (D.C. Cir Jan 11, 2008).   
 123 Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644, 671 (D.C. Cir. 2008)(holding that RFRA extends 
only  to the contours of the rights under First Amendment as established before the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) and 
does not enlarge those rights), vacated, 555 U.S. 1083 (2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 124 Id. at 669. 
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ii.  Al-Zahrani v. Rumsfeld 
The plaintiffs in Al-Zahrani v. Rumsfeld were the families of two of 
the three detainees who allegedly committed suicide, simultaneously, 
in Guantánamo on July 10, 2006.
125
  In early 2009, the plaintiffs filed a 
damages suit against the U.S. government, twenty-four named 
defendants, including Donald Rumsfeld, and one hundred unnamed 
military, civilian, and medical personnel.
126
  The plaintiffs’ allegations 
included being presumed to be enemy combatants, being denied the 
right to an attorney, and being prevented from viewing the evidence 
against them,
127
 in addition to being subjected to extreme 
confinement and “specific methods and acts of physical and 
psychological torture,” including sleep deprivation, full-body cavity 
searches, beatings, verbal abuse, religious abuse—including 
mandatory shaving and desecration of the Qur’an—and various other 
abuses.
128
  As is the case with so many other Guantánamo detainees, 
neither of the plaintiffs’ decedents was ever charged.
129
 
In dismissing the case, the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia cited Rasul v. Myers
130
 as precedent foreclosing plaintiffs’ 
Bivens claims.
131
 
2. Beyond Guantánamo 
i. El-Masri v. Tenet 
Khaled El-Masri is a German national who was abducted while 
vacationing in Macedonia.
132
  Initially taken into custody in 
Macedonia, he was stripped, drugged, hooded, eventually flown to 
Afghanistan,
133
  detained in a bleak prison known as the “Salt Pit”; 
there, he was periodically interrogated and asked to confess his 
relationship to Al Qaeda.
134
  During his incarceration, El-Masri 
protested his detention with a hunger strike; despite being fed 
 
 125 Al-Zahrani v. Rumsfeld, 684 F. Supp. 2d 103, 106 (D.D.C. 2010).  
 126 Id. at 107. 
 127 Id. at 106.   
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. at 107 
 130 Id. at 112. 
 131 Al-Zahrani, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 112. 
 132 El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 532 (E.D. Va. 2006), aff’d 479 F.3d 296 
(4th Cir. 2007). 
 133 Id. at 533–34. 
 134 Id. 
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forcibly, he lost sixty pounds.
135
  CIA Director George Tenet and 
National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice were advised that El-
Masri’s passport was authentic and that the CIA had detained the 
wrong man.
136
  In late May, El-Masri was flown to Albania, released on 
a hill in the middle of the night, and left to make his way back to 
Germany.
137
  El-Masri’s complaint, filed in the District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia, alleged both constitutional and 
international law violations.
138
  The United States immediately filed a 
statement of interest and asserted a formal claim of state secrets 
privilege, eventually intervening in the case and filing a motion to 
dismiss.
139
  The court granted the motion to dismiss—not without a 
few regretful words—based on the state secrets privilege.
140
  A three-
judge panel of the Fourth Circuit decided the case on similar 
grounds,
141
 and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.
142
  Appeals to 
the U.S. Congress were similarly unavailing. 
Though an innocent man at the time of his arrest, El-Masri later 
suffered from the physical and emotional trauma that he had 
endured and was subsequently hospitalized in a psychiatric institution 
following his arrest on suspicion of arson.
143
 
ii. In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees 
In a case involving detainees held in military detention in 
Afghanistan and Abu Ghraib in Iraq, plaintiffs brought constitutional 
claims against Rumsfeld and other military officials alleging due 
process violations, and cruel and unusual punishment.
144
  Reflecting a 
general pattern, the abuses alleged to have occurred at military bases 
in Iraq and Afghanistan are generally even more appalling than those 
 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. at 534. 
 137 Id. 
 138 El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 534–35.  
 139 Id. at 535. 
 140 Id. at 530.  All this occurred before any discovery had taken place.   
 141 El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 296 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 142 El-Masri v. United States, 552 U.S. 947 (2007). 
 143 Margaret Satterthwaite, The Story of El-Masri v. Tenet: Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law in the ‘War on Terror,’ in HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY STORIES  535, 573 
(Deena R. Hurwitz, et al. eds. 2009).  
 144 In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 91 (D.D.C. 2007), aff’d 
sub nom. Ali v. Rumsfeld, No. 07-5178 (D.C. Cir. June 21, 2011); see also id. at 103–08 
(holding special factors counsel hesitation because military affairs, foreign relations, 
and national security are constitutionally committed to the political branches). 
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that allegedly occurred at Guantánamo.
145
  One plaintiff alleged that 
U.S. military personnel hung him to the ceiling upside-down with a 
chain and proceeded to pushing and slapping him until he lost 
consciousness.
146
 Another alleged that he was stripped and 
photographed, subjected to cavity probes, dehydrated, and subjected 
threats of being drowned.
147
  A third was severely beaten, stabbed, 
burned, locked in severe confinement, dragged, menaced by a dog, 
denied food and drink, and threatened with death.
148
 
The district court began its analysis with the threshold question 
of whether the plaintiffs were protected by the Constitution and 
quickly concluded that their claims were foreclosed by Eisentrager and 
Verdugo-Urquidez.
149
 The plaintiffs argued that they were entitled to 
“fundamental rights” under the Constitution in territories subject to 
the control of the United States in accordance with the Insular 
Cases.
150
  Even though the court found that the plaintiffs were unable 
to assert any rights under the Constitution, the court went on to 
examine the special factors that might counsel hesitation in rejecting 
plaintiffs’ Bivens claim on a second, separation-of-powers ground.
151
  
The case reached the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia as 
Ali v. Rumsfeld.
152
  On the appeal, the plaintiffs argued that in 
Boumediene the Court had “adopted a flexible approach that leaves 
open the possibility of the extraterritorial application of 
constitutional provisions other than the Suspension Clause;”153 but 
the D.C. Court of Appeals, while casting doubt on that proposition, 
chose to analyze the case under the Pearson rule and dismissed it on 
qualified immunity grounds, with special factors as an alternative 
basis.154 
 
 145 See CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, REPORT ON TORTURE AND CRUEL, 
INHUMAN AND DEGRADING TREATMENT AT GUANTÁNAMO BAY, CUBA 17, 24 (2006), 
available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/Report_ReportOnTorture.pdf. 
 146 In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d at 88–89. 
 147 Id. at 89. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. at 98. 
 150 Id. at 99. 
 151 Id. at 107 (citing the “hazard of such multi-various pronouncements combined 
with the constitutional commitment of military and foreign affairs to the political 
branches”). 
 152 Ali v. Rumsfeld, No. 07-5178, (D.C. Cir. June 21, 2011). 
 153 Id. 
 154  Id.  
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IV. ANALYSIS 
Although the heuristic is not absolutely perfect, the outcomes in 
these cases largely reflect the pre-Boumediene territorial Constitution, 
which ends at the “water’s edge.”  The biggest differentiator is the 
location of the site of injury in combination with the citizenship 
status of the plaintiffs.  The most successful cases have been by U.S. 
citizens and U.S. resident aliens detained within the territorial United 
States;
155
 the least successful, by aliens detained outside the territorial 
United States.
156
 
Damage awards have resulted in those cases in which the 
plaintiffs were on U.S. territory when the injuries occurred.  Al-Kidd 
and Iqbal settled their claims against lower-level officials,
157
 even 
though their claims against cabinet-level officials were ultimately 
dismissed.
158
  Iqbal’s co-plaintiff Elmaghraby also settled his claims.
159
  
Although one of Padilla’s damages cases was dismissed at the district 
court level in South Carolina, his Ninth Circuit appeal is still going 
forward, and he has appeals available to him in the South Carolina 
case.
160
 
Arar is an apparent exception to the territorial rule; he was 
initially taken into custody while physically present in the United 
States, yet his case failed at every stage.
161
 As Judge Sack noted in 
dissent, the majority artificially divided the complaint into domestic 
claims that did not involve torture and foreign claims that did.
162
 
 
 155 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1937 (2009); Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 
949, 949 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted 131 S. Ct. 415 (2010), rev’d 131 S. Ct. 2074 
(2011).  
 156 See Al-Zahrani v. Rumsfeld, 684 F. Supp. 2d 103 (D.D.C. 2010); In re Iraq & Afg. 
Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D.D.C. 2007), aff’d sub nom. Ali v. Rumsfeld, No. 
07-5178, (D.C. Cir. June 21, 2011); Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 
2006), aff’d, 532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d en banc, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009), 
cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010); Rasul v. Rumsfeld, 414 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 
2006), aff’d sub nom. Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644 (D.C. Cir. 2008), vacated, 555 U.S. 
1083  (2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009); El-Masri v. 
Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 532 (E.D. Va. 2006).  Furthermore, this analysis must be 
qualified by noting that the cases discussed are at different procedural stages.  Some 
have already reached the Supreme Court.  One case, Rasul v. Myers, has reached the 
Supreme Court twice.  See Rasul v. Myers, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009); Rasul v. Myers, 555 
U.S. 1083 (2008). 
 157 See discussion supra Part III.A.1 & Part III.B.1. 
 158 See discussion supra Part III.A.1 & Part III.B.1. 
 159 See supra note 91. 
 160 See discussion supra Part III.A.2. 
 161 See discussion supra Part III.B.2. 
 162 Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 582–83 (2d Cir. 2009). 
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The cases of aliens abroad have failed to win any compensation 
or acknowledgement of wrong for the victim.
163
  Indeed, the Supreme 
Court denied certiorari in El-Masri,
164
  Rasul,
165
 and Arar,
166
 thus 
leaving in place a set of highly conservative decisions that appear to 
ratify, at least for the present, the new national security special factors 
doctrine that the lower courts seem to be fleshing out.
167
 
These outcomes neither reflect the degree of innocence of the 
plaintiffs, nor the extent of the injuries.  While Al-Kidd appears to 
have been guilty of nothing more than too fervent an interest in 
Islam, Iqbal and his co-plaintiff were not in compliance with 
immigration laws.  Jose Padilla had an extensive criminal history, 
including seventeen prior arrests, even before his alleged training 
with Al Qaeda.
168
  Criminality is no justification for torture, but no 
principles of fairness can make sense of the results in these cases.  El-
Masri was a case of mistaken identity.  Arar was detained on the basis 
of misleading information provided by the Canadian government, 
but a Canadian investigation into the matter did not find evidence 
that Canadian officials had played an active part in the decision to 
render him to Syria.
169
  Arar received $9.75 million in compensation 
 
 163 See Al-Zahrani v. Rumsfeld, 684 F. Supp. 2d 103 (D.D.C 2010); In re Iraq & Afg. 
Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 91 (D.D.C. 2007); Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 
2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d en banc, 585 F.3d 559 
(2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010); Rasul v. Rumsfeld, 414 F. Supp. 2d 
26 (D.D.C. 2006); El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 532 (E.D. Va. 2006).  
 164 El-Masri v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 373 (2007). 
 165 Rasul v. Myers, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009). 
 166 Arar v. Ashcroft,130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010).  
 167 Arar, 585 F.3d 559; Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 532 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
(noting as an alternative ground for dismissal that “[t]he danger of obstructing U.S. 
national security policy” is a special factor counseling courts to hesitate before 
creating a Bivens remedy).  It is possible that the Court declined to hear these cases 
because it concluded that they would ultimately fail on the question of qualified 
immunity.  Even if the Court were willing to affirm the constitutional rights of aliens 
abroad, it would be difficult to overcome the argument, under the Pearson rule, that 
these rights were not clearly established when they were allegedly violated. 
 168 United States v. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085, 1115–17(11th Cir. 2011)(noting the 
government’s appeal regarding the downward departure from the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines in Padilla’s case).   
 169 COMM’N OF INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF CAN. OFFICIALS IN RELATION TO MAHER 
ARAR, REPORT OF THE EVENTS RELATING TO MAHAR ARAR: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 14, available at http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/pco-
bcp/commissions/maher_arar/07-09-
13/www.ararcommission.ca/eng/AR_English.pdf.   
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and an apology from the Canadian government, but the United States 
has never admitted wrongdoing in his case.
170
 
These cases thus reflect a harsh rule.  Citizens and U.S. resident 
aliens get damages from someone at some level.
171
  Aliens abroad—
even though they may have suffered appalling deprivations of liberty 
and egregious affronts to their human dignity—get nothing.
172
 
V. CONCLUSION 
In the world of damages, Boumediene changed little.  The 
Supreme Court denied certiorari in El-Masri before issuing its 
opinion in Boumediene and denied certiorari in Arar afterwards.  It 
granted certiorari in Rasul before Boumediene and denied certiorari 
afterwards.  When it granted certiorari in Rasul, it merely vacated the 
D.C. Circuit’s judgment and remanded for reconsideration in light of 
Boumediene.
173
 The D.C. Circuit found little in Boumediene to 
reconsider and reinstated its judgment on a more limited basis.  Nor 
is it evident that Boumediene has had much impact on other lower 
court decisions. 
To some extent, Boumediene’s failure to make an impact can be 
attributed to the intersection of qualified immunity with the 
underlying constitutional jurisprudence.  Because most of the acts 
giving rise to the damages cases under discussion had occurred 
before June 2008, when Boumediene was decided, it could be 
concluded, that the right in question was not “clearly established” for 
 
 170 Ian Austen, Canada Will Pay $9.75 Million to Man Sent to Syria and Tortured, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 26, 2007, A1.   As early as 2003, Congress requested that the Department 
of Homeland Security Inspector General (DHS IG) undertake an investigation into 
Arar’s case.  For more than four years the final report was delayed, apparently by 
Department of Justice obstructions.  Scott Horton, The Missing IG Report on Maher 
Arar, HARPER’S MAG. (Nov. 16, 2007), http://harpers.org/archive/2007/11/hbc-
90001676.  When the IG report was finally released, it was heavily redacted.  Scott 
Horton, More on Maher Arar, HARPER’S MAG. (June 5, 2008), 
http://harpers.org/archive/2008/06/hbc-90003043.  For a redacted version of the 
report, see Final Copy for the Hill, HARPER’S MAG., 
http://harpers.org/media/pdf/OIG-08-18-FinalcopyfortheHill.pdf (last visited Sept. 
23, 2011).   
 171 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949 
(9th Cir. 2009). 
 172 See Al-Zahrani v. Rumsfeld, 684 F. Supp. 2d 103 (D.D.C. 2010); In re Iraq & Afg. 
Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 91 (D.D.C. 2007), aff’d sub nom. Ali v. Rumsfeld, 
No. 07-5178, (D.C. Cir. June 21, 2011); Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 
(E.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d en banc, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 
2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010); Rasul v. Rumsfeld, 414 F. Supp. 2d 26 
(D.D.C. 2006); El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 532 (E.D. Va. 2006). 
 173 Rasul v. Meyers, 555 U.S. 1083 (2008), vacating 512 F.3d 644. 
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actions taking place outside U.S. sovereign territory.  Since no court 
has held thus far that constitutional rights apply beyond 
Guantánamo, the impact of the qualified immunity defense is 
unlikely to change in the near future. 
Ironically, however, Boumediene may end up changing the scope 
of qualified immunity with respect to U.S. citizens.  Prior to 
Boumediene, it would have been difficult for a federal official to claim 
it was not “clearly established” that U.S. citizens are protected by the 
U.S. Constitution when they are abroad, at least to the same extent 
that they are protected by it on U.S. territory.  Boumediene undermines 
that conclusion and throws the qualified immunity analysis into 
disarray because the reach of the Constitution now depends on the 
wisdom of a court determining that it is not “impractical and 
anomalous” to extend the protections of the Constitution to a U.S. 
citizen if that citizen is not within the sovereign territory of the 
United States.  Citizenship would now seem to be only one among 
several of the “Boumediene factors.” 
The situation now presents the reverse of the usual case in 
qualified immunity analyses.  Not infrequently it happens that a court 
will immunize a federal official for a violation of a right that is clearly 
established at the time of the case but that was still in the process of 
evolving at the time the relevant acts took place.  Thus U.S. courts 
have found that U.S. officials have qualified immunity for acts 
committed at Guantánamo before Boumediene was decided, because 
“[n]o reasonable government official would have been on notice that 
plaintiffs had any Fifth Amendment or Eighth Amendment rights” 
before the Supreme Court’s decision.
174
  Boumediene causes the law 
relating to constitutional extraterritoriality as to citizens to regress, at 
least in theory, from being “clearly established” to “not clearly 
established.”   In October 2011, the United States asked the Seventh 
Circuit to reconsider the lower court’s decision in Vance v. Rumsfeld 
because of the “exceptionally important question of whether a court, 
in the absence of legislative authority, may recognize a damages 
action against individual government officials regarding the 
detention and interrogation of military detainees in a foreign war 
zone.”175  The appeal in Vance may be a harbinger. 
 
 
 174 Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013 
(2009).   
 175  Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc, at 1, Vance v. 
Rumsfeld, Civ. No. 09-16478 (7th Cir. Oct. 28, 2011).  
